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ABSTRACT 
The coordination of communication and awareness efforts in the process of Information Security 
Incident Management (ISIM) has been identified as a critical means of enhancing information security 
protection in organizations. This paper aims to explore the nuances of organizational information 
security with respect to the coordination of communication and awareness efforts among organizational 
stakeholders towards achieving a shared, interactive, and participatory ISIM. According to the findings 
of the study in the organizations sampled, it has been identified that reporting, communication, and 
awareness efforts within ISIM were found to be largely uncoordinated. The exploratory findings 
provided a rationale for the proposal of a conceptual model. The model would unify and subsume 
situational awareness and interactive modes of communication toward improving the coordination of 
awareness and communication efforts among stakeholders in the management of information security 
incidents. 
Keywords 
Information Security, Incident Management, Situational Awareness, Incident Reporting, Interactive 
Model of Communication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary large-scale interconnection of computers and cyber-data exchanged globally has 
created an enormous threat to organizations in safeguarding information security, and the proliferation 
of cyber security incidents is rife. Threats can come both externally and internally (i.e., from insiders) 
(Syahrial et al., 2019). A report on 86 global companies commissioned by IBM Security (2019) found 
that malicious cyber-attacks surged to 51% in 2019, and the longer an organization takes to contain and 
manage a threat, the more prohibitively expensive it becomes. Moreover, lengthy downtimes can cause 
reputational risks to an organization (Metzger et al., 2011). The study also found that the time taken to 
contain incidents has grown by 4.9% and that the cost of breaches that were not contained within 200 
days rose to $4.56 million. Therefore, uncoordinated and unsupported management of information 
security incidents has created significant concern among organizations irrespective of their scope, 
mission, setting, or type (Ahmad et al., 2012; Johnson, 2006). 
Nyman and Große (2019) purport that the high levels of information security incidents demand a 
formalized incident management process and call for more empirical research to be conducted to guide 
information security incident management in practice. Ab Rahman and Choo (2015) reason that while 
incident management is a mature field, there is a lack of consistency with respect to describing incident 
management and response in the literature. They found that less than 10% of the research conducted 
involves incident reporting and prioritization (2010-2015). Yohannes et al. (2019) conducted a case 
study on a financial institution in Ethiopia from an information security incident management 
perspective in response to the dearth of studies in this context. They found the lack of standardized 
processes and issues of collaboration, communication, and awareness to be problematic and argued for 
more studies to be conducted within various organizations in Ethiopia. Consequently, the aim of this 
study is to explore nuances of organizational information security with respect to the coordination of 
communication and awareness efforts among organizational stakeholders towards achieving a shared, 
interactive, and participatory Information Security Incident Management (ISIM) process. This prompted 
the following research question (RQ): How do organizations effectively coordinate communication and 
awareness efforts in ISIM?  The minor research questions that guided the study are: (1) How do 
organizations integrate communication and awareness efforts into their ISIM policies and practices? (2) 
To what extent is the integration and stakeholder participation implemented in the process of incident 
communication and awareness efforts within ISIM processes? and (3) How can organizations enhance 
the coordination of communication and awareness efforts within the processes of ISIM practice? 
ISIM strives to address technical issues such as inquiry, containment, and recovery. It aims at preventing 
incidents from a management perspective in which planning, detection, reporting, assessment, response, 
and lessons learned are crucial processes of ISIM (Tøndel et al., 2014).  The effective coordination of 
awareness and communication strategies within ISIM can contribute greatly in mitigating existing and 
future incidents (ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011, 2011). There have been calls for more studies to explore why 
ISIM is so challenging (Tøndel et al., 2014). Some of the challenges include lack of documentation, lack 
of training, lack of planning, misunderstandings between security and control personnel, lack of post-
incident evaluations, and the difference of priorities and perspectives between managers and technical 
personnel (Bartnes et al., 2016b). Some other challenges include gaining senior management 
commitment, involving all employees, the usability issues of technical tools, incident registration, and 
collaboration (Line & Albrechtsen, 2016). 
The management of information security incidents is indeed challenging, as it involves both technical 
and social aspects (Ahmad et al., 2012). As a result, an integrated approach encompassing human, 
organizational, technical, and behavioral factors to information security is crucial to containing 
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information security threats in a coordinated way. Although some organizations have been utilizing 
some standards of ISIM, the need to integrate communication and awareness schemes is not well 
understood and thus inhibits proactive ISIM. Bartnes et al. (2016b) maintain that there is a need for 
further research that details how communication and collaboration among stakeholders within ISIM 
occurs in practice. Similarly, Ahmad et al. (2015) argue that there is a paucity of research that considers 
how the experiences of incident response teams can be used towards improving security processes, and 
most studies focus on the response part of the process and do not consider the “lessons learned” aspect. 
Clearly, the lessons learned from previous incidents can be useful only if there is an effective 
coordination of communication and awareness efforts. This study will explore how communication and 
awareness efforts are coordinated in practice within several Ethiopian organizations. This will assist in 
documenting the experiences of ISIM which will be used as a rationale towards developing a conceptual 
model as an ancillary aim. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second and third sections explicate the related 
works and the research methodology, respectively. The fourth and fifth sections provide an analysis of 
the findings and the discussion of the findings, correspondingly. The sixth section presents the 
conceptual model. The study limitations, contribution to knowledge, and areas of further research 
conclude the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
An information security incident is defined as “a single or a series of unwanted or unexpected 
information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business operations and 
threatening information security” (ISO/ IEC 27035:2016, 2016). The goals and activities of ISIM 
processes are to neutralize the incidents while reducing the damages (Ani & Agbanusi, 2014). Ani and 
Agbanusi (2014), who conducted a systematic overview of the various frameworks proposed towards 
ISIM, identified the following similarities among the various approaches: 
• Preparation – organizational readiness for incidents which involve training, policies, preventative 
security mechanisms (e.g. firewalls, backup and recovery software, logs), and a well-defined 
plan. 
• Detection – a system for reporting incidents. 
• Formulation of response strategy/planning – identifying the most suitable approach for handling 
the incident via analysis and collaborating with appropriate stakeholders. 
• Containment/preservation – development of a strategy to prevent further damage to the system, 
such as disabling services. 
• Eradication – a long-term solution to eliminating the threat; for example, a policy update. 
• Recovery – restoring the system back to normal working order. 
• Lesson Learned/Reporting/Follow-Up and Incident Closure – learning from the incident to 
prevent future similar incidents. 
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Figure 1. Information Security Incident Management Event Flow Diagram  
(adapted from [ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011, 2011]) 
The ISO/IEC 27035 standard, which is the most recognized organizational security standard (Tøndel et 
al., 2014), covers the processes for handling information security incidents and vulnerabilities. As 
depicted in Figure 1, the process of managing an information security incident follows a cyclic process – 
plan and prepare; detect and report; assess and decide; respond (prevent, reduce, recover); and lessons 
learned. These steps involve planning by policy and having the right people to manage the incident, 
identifying and reporting the incident, assessing the incident and making decisions as to how the 
incident is to be resolved, responding to incidents by containing and resolving them, and learning from 
the incident in order to be better prepared for future incidents (ISO/ IEC 27035:2016, 2016). Other 
frameworks include COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies) (ISACA, 
2012) and ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) (Taylor et al., 2007), and NIST 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) (Cichonski et al., 2012). The NIST guideline 
(comparable to the ISO/IEC standard) is also popular – it contains the phases of preparation, detection 
and analysis, containment, eradication and recovery, and post-incident activity (Tøndel et al., 2014). 
Most studies that consider ISIM in practice share several commonalities. Hove et al. (2014) conducted a 
study on ISIM practices in three large organizations in Norway. From this study, two major issues 
related to the coordination of awareness and communication efforts were identified. Employees did not 
know how to report an incident and thus the tacit knowledge of users was being overlooked. Users can 
be valuable sources of information. Distributed structures hindered the collection and dissemination of 
incident-related information. The lack of coordination is evidenced by the lack of assigned 
responsibility. Clearly, one needs to know how to communicate the ’right information” to the “right 
people” to avoid leaking sensitive information. 
Studies show that ISIM is largely uncoordinated.  Ahmad et al. (2015) conducted a case study based on 
the Australian financial sector. They found that there are no formal structures to facilitate the “lessons 
learned” component. This implies that past incidents do not inform the management of new incidents. 
Bartnes et al. (2016b) conducted a study on current ISIM practices of Norwegian electric power 
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organizations. They found that the coordination of ISIM has not improved, as various views persist. In 
addition, organizations do not accord a high level of priority to ISIM. Line (2013) conducted a 
preliminary study that overviewed current ISIM practices in power industries. It was found that the 
process was unsystematic and there was a lack of coordination among the various groups of staff.  
Yohannes et al. (2019) found that in their case study of an Ethiopian bank that there was no formalized 
information security incident management, even though the bank was compliant with ITIL and ISO 
standards. They found that while there was an automated system of detection, issues, such as 
collaborative work, incident reporting, awareness, manual detection systems, post incident sharing of 
experiences and rehearsals were not given due consideration. They found that the lack of awareness, 
lack of skills, the lack of collaboration, and the communication gaps were causative challenges. Jaatun et 
al. (2009), who conducted interviews (n = 9) regarding information security incident management 
processes in the Norwegian petroleum industry, also cited challenges with awareness and reporting. 
Several suggestions have been proposed to deal with the challenges identified in ISIM. Line et al. (2014) 
conducted an interview study on ISIM and concluded that there should be a unified approach to ISIM. 
Similarly, Jaatun et al. (2009) reasoned that there is a need to develop a reporting culture to unify ISIM. 
They propose enhancing the capability of incident management communication, underscoring 
organizational learning and individual training to resolve the communication gap among staff in order to 
unify the risk and situational understanding. They suggest an approach to learning from incidents that is 
both proactive and reactive, as the organization can learn about real time incidents and previous 
incidents, emphasizing organizational learning (Jaatun et al., 2009). 
Several approaches have been proposed to manage ISIM. Metzger et al. (2011) developed a holistic, 
process-oriented approach to ISIM where incident response teams can correlate several incidents across 
multiple channels, which helps in classifying incidents correctly and, depending on the incident, an 
automated or manual reaction can be triggered. This method combined all reporting channels for 
consistency. Despite the successful implementation of the model, they found they needed to support the 
various ways incidents get reported. Furthermore, some incidents are not reported at all, or due to the 
lack of awareness, users are unable to report incidents correctly. Jeong et al. (2008) proposed an inter-
organizational model for organizations that find it difficult to support a security team. Their model 
involves outsourcing their security information with a coordinator organization that can detect and 
analyze incidents for the organization. However, this model has not been implemented, as it merely 
transfers the challenges to another partner organization.  Imamverdiyev (2013) considered the problem 
of prioritizing the volumes of incidents using fuzzy analytics. This can be a technical solution to 
managing incidents; however, it does not address the socio-technical challenges highlighted by extant 
studies. Baskerville et al. (2014) developed a framework that strikes a balance between prevention (i.e., 
managing predicted threats) and information security response (i.e., managing unpredicted threats) 
which encompasses three elements, namely, situational analysis, planning, and operation in both the 
prevention paradigm and response paradigm, with a careful balance between the two.  An advantage of 
the model is that it prioritizes incident management, as it places the “lessons learned: as part of the 
central mode between prevention and response; however, it does not address the awareness and 
communication efforts required in ISIM.  
The coordination of tasks within the security incident response process is highly complex, as it involves 
assigning responsibilities, duties, and tasks in a well-defined manner so that the correct workflows are 
triggered to manage incidents (Metzger et al., 2011). This coordination is often marred by poor 
communication and awareness efforts. Although awareness, training, and updating relevant databases 
and sharing results with trusted communities are key elements of the ISO/IEC 27035 standard, 
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unsatisfactory collaboration and poor communication efforts appear to be rife in ISIM (Tøndel et al., 
2014). Evidently, organizations should be proactive in building the knowledge base of their 
stakeholders. Stakeholders (internal or external) may be a potential threat on occasion or the weakest 
information link (Johnson, 2006). It is evident that the management of incidents requires dynamism and 
coordination of work, and it requires collaboration from personnel of various perspectives to solve often 
complex problems (Bartnes et al., 2016b). Consequently, the aim of this study is to understand how 
organizations coordinate communication and awareness efforts in ISIM as a rationale towards proposing 
a conceptual model to address these challenges revealed in the study. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The main aim of this study is to understand how organizations coordinate awareness and communication 
efforts in ISIM. This research study adopted an exploratory approach in order to achieve this aim. This 
methodology is suitable in studies where the problem is not well-defined.  Typically, exploratory 
research is largely emergent and does not subscribe to a specific paradigm (Munkvold & Bygstad, 
2016). Exploratory research can be a pathway into gaining insight into the research methodology to be 
used in the next phase of the research (Chawla & Sodhi, 2011). As this type of research is characterized 
by flexibility, pragmatism, and continuous discovery (Jupp, 2006), it is difficult to subscribe to a 
quantitative or qualitative research design. While the objective to identify patterns suggests a 
quantitative orientation, the social interactions with the participants suggest a qualitative orientation 
(Ang, 2014). There has been a recent trend towards “generic qualitative studies” which do not subscribe 
to the typical prescribed methodologies that guide interpretive research (i.e., narrative, 
phenomenological, grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study) (Caelli et al., 2003). Reiter (2013) 
also reflects on this trend relative to exploratory research and argues that exploratory research is 
entrenched in a socially constructed view of reality, as the aim is to produce new and insightful ways to 
explain reality and not to develop new facts. Furthermore, Reiter (2013) suggests that a researcher 
cannot be neutral, as in the positivistic tradition; however, rigor can be achieved by being honest and 
transparent with respect to the researcher’s framing. Therefore, it is important to clarify the 
epistemological and ontological position of the researcher in an exploratory study.   
Oates (2005, p. 292) suggests that an interpretive research paradigm “deals with the social context of an 
information system; the social processes by which it is developed and constructed by people through 
which it influences, and is influenced by its social setting.” Therefore, an interpretive lens allows for 
understanding of failures that may be unknown to even those who are immersed in ISIM (Saunders et 
al., 2019). Consequently, the ontological position is relativist, assuming multiple constructed realities, 
while the epistemological viewpoint (i.e., the “relationship between the ‘knower’ [the research 
participant] and the ‘would-be knower’ [the researcher]”) is within the interpretivist tradition which 
advocates for a subjectivist stance (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 131). However, given the exploratory nature of 
this study, a less prescriptive approach was taken, with the aim of obtaining a descriptive picture of the 
research questions posed as a rationale for the development of an applicable and compatible conceptual 
model to the problems raised. The authors were oriented towards a positivistic stance in terms of 
identifying patterns in the data, as this substantiated the development of the conceptual model. 
In this study, a semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix A) was selected as an option for data 
collection. A semi-structured interview is useful in exploratory research, as it can help to clarify and 
discover concepts (Bless et al., 2006).  The interview guide combined quantitative and qualitative 
questions to allow for interpretive reflections. This research employed a :track bound” approach, as the 
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interview guide is based on various extant sources as building blocks (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011), 
including the ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011 (2011) standard. 
The interview guide consisted of two parts. Part I was intended for the information security experts only 
while Part II (which was self-developed) was intended for end-users. Part I consists of three sections. 
Section 1 was designed to obtain background information of the organization. Sections 2 and 3 were 
designed to understand the coordination of awareness and communication efforts among security and 
end-user personnel respectively. Table 1 shows the derivation of the interview guide per question. 
 
Component Question Reference 
Background 1.1-1.1.17 Wooding et al. (2003); Da Veiga and Eloff (2007); Caballero 
(2013) 
Roles and Responsibilities 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4  Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013) 
Application of Standards  2.5, 2.6 and 2.7  Ab Rahman and Choo (2015); Tøndel et al. (2014) 
Formal Agreements 2.8. and 2.9  Johnson (2006) 
ISIM Processes 2.10 Ahmed et al. (2012); Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013); Dodson 
(2001); Kossakowski et al. (1999); and Werlinger et al. (2010) 
Awareness Levels 2.11  Bernsmed and Tøndel (2013) 
Workflows 2.12 and 2.13  Belsis et al. (2005) 
Awareness Efforts 2.14  Johnson (2006) 
Communication Efforts 2.15, 2.17, 2.18 Baker (2002); Dodson (2001); and Wood (2012)  
Communication Experience 2.16 Werlinger et al. (2010)   
Improvement Strategies 2.19 and 2.21 Self-Developed Open-Ended Questions 
Challenges 2.20 Self-Developed Open-Ended Question 
End-User Involvement  3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 Johnson (2006)  
Table 1. The Questionnaire Items Categorized into Components 
A pilot test was conducted among information security experts (n = 6) from each of the organizations 
involved in the study to assess the content validity of the interview guide. A purposive sampling strategy 
was designed to meet the following criteria – engagement with large data sets, vulnerability to security 
incidents, engagement in ISIM processes, and proximity to the researcher. 
Validity in qualitative type studies is confirmed by four basic tests – credibility (i.e., did the researcher 
accurately portray the participants’ perceptions), dependability (i.e., coherence of the methods used), 
transferability (i.e., the extent to which the “working hypothesis” can be transferred to another context, 
and confirmability (i.e., the extent to which the data can be confirmed by others) (Bradley, 1993). (Note: 
Lincoln and Guba [1986]  provided a baseline of techniques to achieve validity in qualitative studies 
which correspond to the criteria used by positivists). Credibility was achieved by the following 
techniques: prolonged engagement, triangulation, peer debriefing, and member checking. The field work 
was conducted over a period of six months. Peer debriefing was achieved by submitting the data and 
analysis to the secondary researcher for verification. The triangulation of data collection techniques was 
used as a mechanism of support and to enhance the validity of the study. The study relied on multiple 
sources of evidence to increase validity (i.e., document analysis of information security policies, 
procedures, and standards). A copy of the interview notes was disseminated to the participants for 
confirmation. Transferability was achieved by means of ‘thick description’ by attaining a richer 
understanding of the context via the background information and document analysis of the policies. The 
applicability of the research instruments was thoroughly linked with existing standards and extant 
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literature for standardization.  Dependability was achieved via maintaining an audit trail. This was 
achieved by maintaining a list of data records, initially in paper format, and thereafter transferred to a 
digital format. Confirmability implies maintaining objectivity and neutrality. The neutrality of the study 
was achieved by assigning research assistants and data collectors in some instances to eliminate biases. 
The data for the interview guide was collected both via email and face-to-face. The responses were 
collected in Amharic and translated into English. The collected data was analyzed quantitatively and 
qualitatively, case by case, through frequent comparison and inductive analysis based on preformatted 
themes (Mabuza et al., 2014).  
RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
Profile of the Sample  
A profile of organizations included in the study are summarized in Table 2. The study involved 32 
participants’ accounts of ISIM practices. The sample consisted of – information security managers (n = 
6), information security experts (n = 7), operational managers (n = 5), information security IT auditors 
(n = 4), information security risk analysis officers (n = 3), and end-users (n = 7). Most of the respondents 
from the sample have a basic level of education and a first degree commensurate with their positions 
within the organization. All the organizations indicated that they utilize basic information security 
mechanisms. 
 
Code  Type  Function  Category  Size  No 
ORG A  Government  Aviation  Commercial   >8000  6  
ORG B  Government  Financial  Commercial   >10, 000  4  
ORG C  Private  Financial  Commercial  >300  5  
ORG D  Government  Media Corporate  >1500  5  
ORG E  Private  Financial  Commercial  >1500  5  
ORG F  Government  Technology  Agency  >2500  7  
TOTAL   32  
Table 2. Background and Characteristics of the Organizations 
 
Empirical Results and Analysis  
In terms of the coordination of awareness efforts prescribed in the various policy documents, it was 
found that a large proportion of the awareness efforts are geared toward account usage (i.e., 
authentication) and antivirus installations.  The coordination of awareness efforts of security incident 
handling and risk awareness were less integrated in policy documents as compared with the other 
aspects of information security. The responses are summarized in Table 3 (Question Q1.5). 
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Integrated Aspects Number Percentage 
Security Incident Handling 10 31.25 
Risk Awareness 9 28.13 
Account Usage 29 90.63 
Internet Application 25 78.13 
Software Installation 20 62.50 
Antivirus Installation 29 90.63 
Table 3. Aspects of Information Security Awareness Issues Addressed in Organizations 
 
Based on the responses, it was surmised that only ORG A and ORG B have a specific ISIM policy 
document (question Q1.6). ORG C from the private sector has a general information security policy 
document. The balance of the organizations are either in the process of developing a working policy 
document or they do not have a policy document in place. Most of the respondents (81%) confirmed that 
information security policies are drafted by information security experts and are then forwarded to 
middle management for approval. Notably, government organizations tend to have their own ISIM 
policy document and private organizations are in the process of developing a policy document. 
Based on the responses related to the roles and responsibilities of management in ISIM, it was 
established that five organizations (ORGs A, B, D, E and F) are guided by the Ethiopian Information 
Network Security Agency (INSA) regarding information security policies (questions Q2.1 - Q2.3). In all 
cases, the security personnel develop the security policies, while management ensures its approval. 
INSA is involved in the process of initiating information security structures and guidelines in all 
governmental organizations and some private organizations. 
Evidently, the communication efforts by managers are largely underwhelming (question Q2.4). The use 
of standards is sporadic, as it was revealed that only one organization (ORG A) from the government 
sector is on track to comply with the ISO 27035 standard (questions Q2.5, Q2.6 and Q2.7). Most of the 
participants (94%) indicated that the application of information security standards in their organizations 
is at the initial planning stage.  The participants indicated that the slow adoption of standards is due to a 
lack of awareness about the existence of such standards. Furthermore, the participants indicated that the 
adoption of standards would not have relevance for their organizational information security incident 
operations. The following reason was offered by participant number three (an information security 
manager): “However, Lack [sic] of adequate knowledge on the availability of information security 
standards issues and lack of management commitment to use the existing standards are the factors which 
have been hindering our organization to adapt the standards.” There also was no evidence suggesting the 
application of specific workflows for ISIM processes (questions Q2.12 and Q2.13).  
The application of formal agreements with employees concerning information security policies is 
marginal (questions Q2.8 and Q2.9). The lack of formal agreements is generally attributed to the lack of 
awareness of incident management. The responses to question Q2.10, which required the participants to 
assess their organizations’ formal provisions with respect to ISIM processes, are summarized in Figure 
2. “Incident response” appears to be the most formalized action while “incident assessment and 
analysis” is the least formalized action. 
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Figure 2. Responses across ISIM Parameters 
 
The responses to question Q2.11, which required the participants to rate the level of information security 
incident awareness and risk understanding of employees with respect to information security incident 
awareness indicators, is summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4. An ISIM Awareness Assessment Indicators Matrix 
The ISIM awareness assessment indicators matrix was derived by the respondents scoring each indicator 
from Poor to Excellent, and these were encoded into Likert scales (1 to 6 respectively) for analysis. Each 
management category was given a mean score to represent the overall response per category. Although 
the general awareness quota is low, the rate of awareness is much higher among ICT experts. 
Most of the techniques employed by organizations to raise the awareness of information security 
incidents have been implemented via “promotional,” “educational,” and “informational methods” 
(question Q2.14). The information security incident awareness raising methods, as utilized by the 
organizations, is summarized in Table 5. Punitive measures, such as penalties and accountability, are not 
given due consideration by the organizations under study. 
  










Knowledge about ICT systems 
and components   
1.9 3.12 3.1 2.1 5 
Information security competence 1.2 2 3.4 1.1 5.8 
Reporting security incidents 1.1 2.8 2.3 0.9 5.7 
Up-to-date knowledge about 
relevant threats 
0.9 2.7 1.9 1.8 4.1 
Learning from previous incidents   3.9 4.2 2.9 3.7 5.8 
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Awareness raising methods  ORG A  ORG B  ORG C  ORG D  ORG E  ORG F 
Promotional methods  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Enforcing methods  √  X  X  X  X  √ 
Educational methods  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Informational methods (i.e. 
updates on information security) 
√  √  √  √  √  √ 
Digital methods  X  X  X  X  X  √ 
Face-to-face guidance methods  √  √  X  √  X  √ 
Table 5. ISIM Awareness Raising Methods per Organization 
Most of the organizations used manual means of reporting information security incidents (question 
Q 2.15). The usage per reporting mechanism is as follows – manual reporting (93.75%), face-to-face 
contact (62.50%), electronic means (46.88%), telephone reporting (43.75%), audio-visual means 
(21.88%), and customized application software (15.63%).  
The level of an employee’s communication experience with respect to ISIM was found to be at a very 
poor or fair level among all managerial levels, except among the experts (question Q2.16). This implies 
that peer and vertical communication among users and managers was poor compared with peer 
communication among expert users. 
The frequency of communication regarding information security incidents is largely uncoordinated. 
Most of the respondents (40.6%) indicated that information security incident communication efforts 
(both peer-to-peer and laterally) are conducted usually when an incident arises (question Q 2.17). Figure 
3 shows the percentage of frequency of information security incident communication in the studied 
organizations. Case in point: “I usually communicate among ourselves and security personnel when 
incident arises on how to protect and mitigate current security issues without using any formal means of 
information security communication mechanism [sic],” (Participant No. 11) 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage Frequency of ISIM Communication within the Studied Organizations 
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The communication and reporting efforts of information security incidents is largely uncoordinated. It 
was established that most organizations usually communicate via short face-to-face meetings (question 
Q2.18). Only two organizations (ORGs A and B) coordinated communication efforts through electronic 
means. A case in point: “The routine information security cases are not communicated to the operational 
staff, whereas the filtered or analyzed information is not reported to decision makers. We were also 
rarely communicated about information security incidents that were believed to be critical by the ICT 
staff and experts” [sic] (Participant No. 17). 
An inspection of the opinions regarding the methods that can be used to improve the awareness and 
communication efforts among stakeholders revealed that the majority of respondents (91%) opted for 
policy change, training, and a coordinated incident reporting and awareness effort (question  Q2.19). 
An examination of the responses concerning the types of challenges involved in the coordination of 
communication and awareness efforts in ISIM revealed the following challenges – lack of planning, 
policies, awareness and managerial commitment, and no established center for information security 
training (question Q2.20). 
The respondents offered the following recommendations with respect to the manner ISIM 
communication efforts can be integrated effectively into an organizational information security policy 
(question #Q2.21) – integration of reporting policies on ISIM; proactive reporting of information 
security incidents; enhancing the awareness of ISIM; strong managerial commitment; enforcing 
automated security incident communication policy and procedure; stronger linkage between an 
organization’s information security team and public relations; benchmarking of information security 
standards; building an information security knowledge base, and the deployment of a skilled information 
security incident response team (ISIRT).  
Apparently, there is scant involvement of end-users both in the process of information security incident 
policy formulation, implementation, and communication efforts (questions Q3.1 –Q3.4). The security 
experts prepare awareness documents for employees, and awareness training is provided by security 
experts with the support of mid-level management. However, most end-users did not get an invitation to 
participate in information security policy formulation and incident preparation. The reasons cited for the 
lack of involvement of end-users include confidentiality, work overload, and the lack of expertise in 
information security. Only two organizations (ORGs A and B) have initial trials involving end-users in 
the process of information security incident policy formulation. These organizations provided 
consultative training for their end-users. Moreover, a fair balance of routine work and the information 
security awareness scheme was implemented among these organizations. 
The accounts of end-user involvement in information security incident cases revealed that most 
respondents (57.14%) are highly involved in high-level policy issues as opposed to technical and 
security issues (question Q3.5). The data extracted from Part II of the interview guide confirmed the 
status of the involvement of end-users in ISIM. The excluded end-users indicated that they would prefer 
to be consulted in such matters for shared understanding and for upskilling. One end-user indicated that 
such involvement would not only have been to the benefit of himself but also to the benefit of the 
organization. Case in point: “It would have been very good if our organization would have provided me 
the opportunity to participate in information security issues that concern us to the benefit of the 
organization” (End-User No. 3, ORG A). The following case in point also establishes the need for end-
user involvement in ISIM: “I think it will be good if the organization frequently and consistently 
practice information security training and awareness to all employees irrespective of their position and 
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role. And we also need a computer based system that alarms us that we are under threat or to aware us 
[sic]” (End User No. 4, ORG C). Evidently end-users would prefer to be involved in ISIM. 
As most of the organizations did not have a standardized information security incident management 
policy document, the study considered related documents, such as ICT Policy, Information Management 
Policy, and User Management Policy, to confirm the responses of the participants. 
DISCUSSION  
Some of the challenges observed in this research are echoed in published academic work. For instance, 
lack of managerial commitment, lack of collaboration, and lack of documentation are known weaknesses 
in ISIM (Bartnes et al., 2016a).  With respect to the first minor research question (RQ-1), it was found 
that the coordination of communication and awareness efforts are largely informal and are mired by a 
lack of planning and managerial commitment; however, there was a drive toward including ISIM in 
policy documents. The findings of this study are also comparable to Yohannes et al. (2019). In their case 
study on an Ethiopian bank, they also found that there is a lack of mechanisms to report incidents. They 
also note that some incidents go unreported due to poor communication efforts. 
The importance of coordination between external and internal stakeholders with respect to incident 
reporting was also highlighted by extant studies (Hove et al., 2014).  However, as reflected by Bartnes et 
al. (2016a) and Tøndel et al. (2014), the collaboration among stakeholders in incident reporting remains 
a challenge. This finding is also comparable with this study. Furthermore, with respect to the minor 
question (RQ-2), it was found that while end-users would prefer to be involved in ISIM, the import of 
their contribution is largely ignored in the process. Consequently, most end-users have a scant awareness 
of ISIM and the reporting process. This paper proposes that involving end-users in ISIM can reduce the 
number and severity of information security incidents. First, the involvement of end-users in ISIM may 
prevent accidental and malicious insider threats, as end-users cannot use the excuse of being ignorant of 
which actions constitute an information security breach. Second, end-users will be able to identify and 
report an incident more efficiently, thereby reducing the severity of the incident. 
In the organizations studied from Ethiopia, the ISIM issue is a relatively new concept for most 
organizations. The organizations studied are characterized by the absence of a strong ISIM policy 
document and low levels of stakeholder participation, with an emphasis on responding to incidents (i.e., 
reactive) rather than an effective proactive strategy. This implies that Ethiopian organizations are highly 
susceptible to information security incidents. Most of the organizations studied emphasized general 
information security threats and technical security equipment installations. It has been recognized that 
there is a need for a fair balance between prevention and response for an organization to proactively and 
retroactively respond to incidents (Baskerville et al., 2014). The lack of plans and formal employee 
collaboration in the process of information security incidents could pose a severe risk to organizations 
(Tøndel et al., 2014; Werlinger et al., 2010). As a result, it cannot be overstated that organizations must 
include proactive planning, resource allocation, and formal employee involvement in all phases of ISIM 
(Ab Rahman & Choo, 2015). 
The findings of this study imply that the coordination of awareness and communication efforts are 
executed in a fragmented and disjointed manner. Werlinger et al. (2010) observed that most 
organizations do not have the culture of working collaboratively with stakeholders and end-users, 
especially in terms of setting and communicating information security incident policies. The findings of 
this study also established that the culture of information security incident awareness and 
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communication is largely absent. It can be reasoned that ISIM requires a reframing of awareness and 
communication efforts into an inclusive process, which is the subject of the next section. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
This study identified two key problems in ISIM – poor coordination of communication and awareness 
efforts. These key problems negatively influence the reporting of incidents and the collaborative power 
of groups acting in coordination, and this presents a major risk to organizations.  These issues led the 
study to unpack the final minor research question (i.e., how can organizations enhance the coordination 
of communication and awareness efforts within the processes of ISIM practice?).  
Most studies recommended training programs for awareness creation (Hove et al., 2014; Tøndel et al., 
2014; Yohannes et al., 2019). Based on the challenges identified in the exploratory study, a socio-
technical solution may be required to coordinate awareness efforts. ISIM will benefit from a socio-
technical solution to combat incident challenges proactively in organizations (Werlinger et al., 2010). 
An alternative way of increasing awareness may be achieved through policy. Wiant (2005) suggested 
that information policy may increase the awareness of incidents; however, this empirical study found 
that policy does not influence the number and severity of incidents reported. Tøndel et al. (2014) 
formulated a model of incident management based on a systematic review of the literature. In the model, 
the “plan and prepare” phase catered for incident management awareness (via training) while the 
“response” phase catered for communication efforts. They argued that an incident tracking system will 
facilitate communication among technical staff. However, they contend that there is a lack of policies on 
formal channels for communication.  They suggested that incident ticketing systems require a shared 
mental model to improve coordination of communication efforts. However, they could not verify the 
process of a shared mental model; they felt that this may be the missing element in the information 
required by technicians in incident ticketing systems. Entin and Entin (2000) surmised that mental 
models create awareness and the accuracy and congruence of these models impact a team’s level of 
Situational Awareness. Scarfone et al. (2008) argue that maintaining Situational Awareness in incident 
management involves planning, documenting, and assigning roles and responsibilities. Therefore, the 
process must be managed carefully, which may be the reason why this process is deficient in ISIM. 
Webb et al. (2014) highlighted the relevance of Situational Awareness to information security in general 
and specifically to information security risk management which share many of the problems with ISIM 
– (1) information risk identification is perfunctory; (2) security risks are estimated without due attention 
to situation awareness; and (3) risk assessments are done intermittently without attention to historical 
data. In a previous study conducted by the current authors (Padayachee & Worku, 2017), the application 
of Situational Awareness to ISIM was considered. As there are few descriptions of a Shared Situational 
Awareness model for organizations, this model considered representations from other contexts, such as 
supply chain management (Kurapati et al., 2013a; Kurapati et al., 2013b). The model developed by the 
authors demonstrated that the process of incident management could iterate from individual Situational 
Awareness to Shared Situational Awareness, thereby increasing the responsiveness and collaborative 
power in the process. However, the model did not address the pathways of communication channels. 
Linderoth et al. (2015, p. 321), who conducted a study within emergency situations which share a 
similarity with ISIM, found that Situational Awareness, communication, and attitude were challenges 
and they stated that effective communication pathways “are essential to obtain sufficient and identical 
situation awareness.” The processes of incident preparation, detection, and reporting are crucial steps in 
ISIM, which are followed by assessment, decision, response, and lessons learned (Humphreys, 2008). 
Consequently, communication flow is a vital component of every step in cyber security incident 
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response. The next elaboration aims to show a formalized approach to coordinating Situational 
Awareness with communication pathways. 
Situational Awareness 
Situational Awareness is more than just being aware of “numerous pieces of data,” as it requires an 
advanced level of situational understanding and a projection of future system states (Endsley, 1995). 
Situational Awareness is the perception and comprehension of the elements in the current state and a 
projection of their status into the near future state (Endsley, 1988), which requires a user’s ability to 
understand, infer and make decisions proactively based on empirical information about a situation. 
Figure 4 demonstrates an application of Situational Awareness to ISIM. (The application of Situational 
Awareness to ISIM was developed by the authors, however, the basic elements of Situational Awareness 
were adapted from Endsley (1995). Webb et al. (2014) argued that Situational Awareness is highly 
suitable to organizational process design. 
Figure 4. Levels of Situational Awareness for Information Security Incident Management 
Situational Awareness could have a potential role in understanding, perceiving, and anticipating future 
incidents so that active incidents are addressed proactively. According to Barford et al. (2010), there are 
seven aspects of Situational Awareness which can be applied to incident management, which were also 
explored in a previous work by the authors of the current paper (Padayachee and Worku, 2017): (1) 
awareness of the current situation which includes situation recognition (knowing that an attack is 
occurring) and identification (i.e., type of attack), the source (who, what) and target; (2) awareness of 
the impact of the attack (impact assessment, vulnerability analysis), which includes current impact and 
future assessment; (3) situation tracking; (4) awareness of the adversary’s behavior, trends, and intent 
analysis; (5) awareness of why and how the current situation was caused; (6) awareness of the 
trustworthiness of the collected situation awareness data; (7) projecting and constraining future actions 
from the adversary, whereby, the constraint involves understanding intent, opportunity, and capability.  
Moreover, a multi-actor activity like ISIM should be subsumed in a Shared Situational Awareness 
framework.  According to Endsley and Jones (2001, p. 48), Shared Situational Awareness is defined as 
“the degree to which team members possess the same SA (Situational Awareness) on shared SA 
(Situational Awareness) requirements.” Shared Situational Awareness, which is more appropriate to 
organizational settings, involves “a number of persons trying to form a common picture” (Nofi, 2000, p. 
28). 
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Figure 5. Communication Pathways to Achieve Shared Situational Awareness for ISIM 
The relationship between Shared Situational Awareness and socio-technical systems has not been 
thoroughly explored (Kurapati et al., 2012).  Nofi (2000) suggests that building Shared Situational 
Awareness within organizations involves the following criteria: first, consider the individual Situational 
Awareness within the framework of what needs to be accomplished. Second, establish roles of other 
members of the organization to share their awareness appropriately (mental models) by using a 
communication protocol. Third, integrate various individual mental models of the situation to develop a 
common understanding. In this modification of the “Conceptual Model for Shared Situational 
Awareness for Information Security Incident Management,” the authors leverage communication 
pathways to address this deficiency in the original conceptualization (see Figure 5). The notion of a 
communication protocol within Situational Awareness was adapted from Linderoth et al. (2015); 
however, the application to ISIM was developed by the authors. 
In Figure 5, the user detects an incident and will need to report the incident. The user will report it 
according to his/her perception of the elements involved in the incident detected; for example, the type 
of attack, and the source and target of the attack. Based on his/her perceptions and comprehension of the 
current situation, the user also will create a projection of future incidents. The user will then 
communicate his/her report to the ISIRT team who will interpret and analyze the report. Using this 
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information and additional tools (e.g., impact assessment and vulnerability analysis) and their 
perceptions and comprehension of the current situation, the ISIRT team will also conduct a projection of 
future incidents in order to plan and prepare for managing future incidents and lessons learned. This will 
be an internal communication between the ISIRT team members. The ISIRT team will communicate 
assessments and decisions to the wider stakeholders. In the next sub-section, the communication 
protocol for the conceptual model is explored in further detail. 
An Interactive Model of Communication for ISIM  
In general terms, “[c]ommunication implies a sender, a channel, a message, a receiver, a relationship 
between sender and receiver, an effect, a context in which communication occurs and a range of things 
to which ‘messages’ refer” (McQuail & Windahl, 2015, p. 5). According to Sellnow (2005), there are 
three basic communication models – the linear model, the interactive model, and the transactional 
model. The linear model views communication as one-directional, while the interactive model is 
bidirectional. The transactional model is more advanced than the interactive model, as it also considers 
the context of the communication which may influence the interaction, such as culture. However, the 
transactional model encourages non-verbal cues and “noise” as communication between senders and 
receivers occurs simultaneously (Businesstopia, 2018). The interactive model, more specifically, the 
Interactive Model of Communication (IMC) was chosen for this study, as it is often used for the Internet 
where people can respond to mass communication (Businesstopia, 2018).  Additionally, it is beyond the 
scope of this research to consider the cultural and societal issues that may affect communication. 
Communication models have been applied within ICT settings (Madida, 2018; Moise, 2008; Velten & 
Arif, 2016). However, there appears to be few instances of its application to incident management, with 
the exception of Valecha et al. (2012). 
Valecha et al. (2012) used IMC in order to standardize emergency communication reports. They 
developed a messaging model which determines the structure of a message and standardizes the format 
so that it could be shared with several departments. They used the model to identify key elements and 
state transitions in emergency communications. They indicate that their work could be extended to 
information management, coordination, and accountability. However, this study will propose using the 
communication model within the context of Situational Awareness.  
The underlying rationale in applying a communication model, such as the IMC (see Figure 6), is to 
enhance the communication of information security incidents, policies, and procedures in a coordinated 
manner. The model deals with the exchange of information and messages taking place bi-directionally 
from sender to receiver and vice-versa (Schramm, 1954). The IMC takes into account the 
communicators’ fields of experience – the greater that their field of experience overlaps, the greater the 
understanding between the communicators (Wood, 2014). The concept of a shared understanding 
appears to be congruent with Shared Situational Awareness. Successful application of the IMC model in 
incident management is also shaped by the technical abilities and communication skills of both the 
sender and the receiver, and this is known as the field of experience. There also may be interferences to 
communication such as process, physical, semantic, and psychosocial barriers (Lunenburg, 2010). It is 
beyond the scope of this research to consider these interferences. The model will facilitate the 
management and exchange of information among stakeholders regarding encountered incidents, which 
can potentially answer the “What,” “When,” and “Who” aspect of the incident.  In the next elaboration, 
an application of the concept is unpacked. 
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Figure 6. Interactive Model of Communication 
(adapted from Schramm, 1954). 
 
Application of the Conceptual Model 
Figure 7 shows the application of using IMC and Situational Awareness in ISIM within a role-based 
system. 
 
Figure 7. An Application of the Conceptual Model 
 
This application of the conceptual framework focuses on the phases of “Detection and Reporting” and 
“Response,” as there is poor communication between reporting the incident and the notification back to 
the users regarding the response. The user detects an incident within the field of experience (based on 
prior planning and preparation and lessons learned from previous incidents) and needs to decode the 
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incident. The user needs to formally document (encode) the incident. The user will encode the incident 
according to his/her perception of the elements involved in the incident detected; for example, the type 
of attack, and the source and the target of the attack. Based on his/her perceptions and comprehension of 
the current situation, the user also will create a projection of future incidents using specific codes and 
data elements. The user then will upload his/her report to the ISIRT team, which will interpret and 
analyze the information (i.e., decode) based on past incidents and lessons learned (i.e., their field of 
experience). Using this information and additional tools (e.g., impact assessment and vulnerability 
analysis) and perceptions and comprehension of the current situation, the ISIRT team will also encode a 
projection of future incidents, which includes planning and preparation for managing future incidents 
and lessons learned. They also will encode their assessment, response, and decisions regarding the 
incident. They then will direct their assessment and decisions, which will be forwarded to all users based 
on their roles. Each user then decodes the assessments and decision report and they will encode their 
feedback (including a projection of future incidents) to the ISIRT team for verification. Table 6 shows 
how the incident is managed within the conceptual framework. The model is intended to work in a role-
based system in order to manage multiple stakeholders.  
 
ROLE  Perception of the 
elements in the 
incident  
Comprehension of the 
current situation  




(the reporter of 
the incident)  
Decode the new 
Incident  
Identify new  
Incident 
 
Encode the  
Incident  
-Incident Source  
-Incident Category  
-Incident Risk  
-Incident Target 
Encode the Projection of 
future incidents with the 
support of additional enablers 
such as situational, structural 
and automated tools.  
USER Report of 
Incident  
ISIRT  Decode report from 
ISIRT  
Encode the  
Incident  
-Register Incident  
-Review Incident  
-Verify Incident  
-Analyze Incident  
-Scale Incident  
-Classify Incident  




-Filter Incident according 
to roles  
Encode the Projection of 
future incidents. Plan and 
Prepare for future incidents. 
Lessons Learnt in preparation 
for future incidents.  
ISIRT Report  
of the Incident  
USER 1…N  Decode the ISIRT 
Report according to 
roles  
Encode the ISIRT Report 
according to roles  
Encode the Projection of 
future incidents based on the 
collective information.  
Submit 
Verification of 
Action to ISIRT  
Table 6. An Application of the Conceptual Model 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed a novel conceptual model to address the challenges identified by an empirical 
study. The model potentially will leverage the collaborative power of bringing diverse stakeholders 
together, including end-users via Shared Situational Awareness. The communication channels are 
clearly outlined and provide a mechanism to develop a unified understanding of ISIM.  Although this 
study was exploratory with a limited sample size, it provides new empirical data on ISIM practices (with 
respect to awareness and communication efforts) which appears to be congruent to other global research 
studies. As the study was limited to organizations in Ethiopia, the findings may not be generalizable to 
all contexts. The research approach for this study should be viewed within a framework of a design 
science approach. The preliminary phases of a design science approach requires the identification and 
description of a relevant problem (March & Storey, 2008) which was presented here. Future research 
will involve prototyping and evaluating the conceptual model. 
REFERENCES 
Ab Rahman, N. H., & Choo, K.-K. R. (2015). A survey of information security incident handling in the cloud. Computers & 
Security, 49, 45-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.11.006 
Ahmad, A., et al. (2012). Incident response teams–challenges in supporting the organisational security function. Computers 
& Security, 31(5), 643-652. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2012.04.001 
Ahmad, A., et al. (2015). A case analysis of information systems and security incident responses. International Journal of 
Information Management, 35(6), 717-723. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2015.08.001 
Ahmed, M., et al. (2012). Human errors in information security. International Journal of Advanced Trends in Computer 
Science and Engineering. 1(3),, 82-87. 
Ang, S. H. (2014). Research design for business & management. Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473909694 
Ani, U. P. D., & Agbanusi, N. C. (2014). A comparative assessment of computer security incidence handling. Journal of 
Advances in Mathematics and Computer Science. 4(22), 3120-3134. https://doi.org/10.9734/BJMCS/2014/11874 
Baker, K. A. (2002). Organizational communication. Retrieved from  
https://web.archive.org/web/20190326144116/http://www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/doe/benchmark/ch13.pd
f  
Barford, P., et al. (2010). Cyber SA: Situational awareness for cyber defense. In S. Jajodia, P. Liu, V. Swarup & C. Wang 
(Eds.), Advances in information security (pp.3-13). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0140-8_1 
Bartnes, M., et al. (2016a). Current practices and challenges in industrial control organizations regarding information security 
incident management – does size matter? Information security incident management in large and small industrial 
control organizations, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 12, 12-26. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.12.003 
Bartnes, M., et al. (2016b). The future of information security incident management training: A case study of electrical power 
companies. Computers & Security, 61, 32-45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2016.05.004 
Baskerville, R., et al. (2014). Incident-centered information security: Managing a strategic balance between prevention and 
response. Information and Management, 51(1), 138-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2013.11.004 
Belsis, M. A., et al. (2005). Workflow based security incident management. In Proceedings of the Panhellenic Conference on 
Informatics (pp. 684-694). https://doi.org/10.1007/11573036_65 
Bernsmed, K., & Tøndel, I. A. (2013). Forewarned is forearmed: Indicators for evaluating information security incident 
management, In H. Morgenstern, R. Ehlert, F. Freiling, S. Frings, O.  Goebel, D.  Guenther, S. Kiltz, J. Nedon, & D. 
Schadt (Eds.), Seventh International Conference on IT Security Incident Management and IT Forensics (pp. 3-14). 
https://doi.org/10.1109/IMF.2013.14 
Bless, C., et al. (2006). Fundamentals of social research methods: An African perspective, Juta and Company, Ltd. 
Bradley, J. (1993). Methodological issues and practices in qualitative research. The Library Quarterly, 63(4), 431-449. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/602620 
Padayachee and Worku                                                                                              Information Security Incident Management Coordination 
The African Journal of Information Systems, Volume 12, Issue 2, Article 1    129 
Businesstopia. (2018). Models of communication. Retrieved from https://www.businesstopia.net/communication 
Caballero, A. (2013). Information security essentials for IT managers: Protecting mission-critical systems. In J. R. Vacca 
(Ed.), Computer and information security handbook (pp. 379-407). Morgan Kaufmann. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-394397-2.00021-0 
Caelli, K., et al. (2003). ‘Clear as mud’: Toward greater clarity in generic qualitative research. International Journal of 
Qualitative methods, 2(2), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1177/160940690300200201 
Chawla, D., & Sodhi, N. (2011). Research methodology: Concepts and cases. Vikas Publishing House. 
Cichonski, P., et al. (2012). Computer security incident handling guide (SP 800-61 Rev. 2). National Institute of Standards 
and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2 
Da Veiga, A., & Eloff, J. H. P. (2007). An information security governance framework. Information Systems Management, 
24(4), 361-372. https://doi.org/10.1080/10580530701586136 
Dodson, R. (2001). Information incident management. Information Security Technical Report, 3(6), 45-53. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1363-4127(01)00307-7 
Endsley, M. R. (1988). Design and evaluation for situation awareness enhancement. In Proceedings of the Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (pp. 97-101). https://doi.org/10.1177/154193128803200221 
Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Journal of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society, 37(1), 32-64. https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049543 
Endsley, M. R., & Jones, V. M. (2001). A model of inter-and intrateam situation awareness: Implications for design, training, 
and measurement. In M. McNeese, E. Salas, & M. R. Endsley (Eds.), New trends in cooperative activities: 
Understanding system dynamics in complex environments (pp. 46-47). Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
Entin, E. B., & Entin, E. E. (2000). Assessing team situation awareness in simulated military missions. Proceedings of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (pp. 73-76). SAGE Publications. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/154193120004400120 
Hove, C., et al. (2014). Information security incident management: Identified practice in large organizations. In F. Freiling, 
H. Morgenstern, S. Frings, O. Goebel, D. Guenther, J. Nedon, & D. Schadt (Eds.), Eighth International Conference 
on IT Security Incident Management & IT Forensics (pp. 27-46). https://doi.org/10.1109/IMF.2014.9 
Humphreys, E. (2008). Information security management standards: Compliance, governance and risk management. 
Information Security Technical Report, 13(4), 247-255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.istr.2008.10.010 
IBM Security. (2019). Cost of a data breach report 2019. Retrieved from 
https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/executive-summary https://doi.org/10.1016/S1361-3723(19)30081-8 
Imamverdiyev, Y. (2013). An information security incident prioritization method. In 7th International Conference on 
Application of Information and Communication Technologies (pp. 1-5).  
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICAICT.2013.6722750 
ISACA. (2012). Cobit 5: Enabling procceses. Author. 
ISO/IEC 27035:2016. (2016). Information technology — security techniques — information security incident management:  
Part 1: Principles of incident management. International Organization for Standardization. 
ISO/IEC 27035-1:2011. (2011). Information technology – security techniques – information security incident management: 
Part 1: Principles of incident management . International Organization for Standardization. 
Jaatun, M. G., et al. (2009). A framework for incident response management in the petroleum industry. International Journal 
of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2(1-2), 26-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2009.02.004 
Jeong, K., et al. (2008). A security coordination model for an inter-organizational information incidents response supporting 
forensic process. In J-H. Kim, D. Delen, P. Jinsoo, F. Ko, & Y.J. Na (Eds.), Fourth International Conference on 
Networked Computing and Advanced Information Management (pp. 143-148). 
https://doi.org/10.1109/NCM.2008.126 
Johnson, E. C. (2006). Security awareness: Switch to a better programme. Network Security, 2, 15-18. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1353-4858(06)70337-3 
Jupp, V. (2006). The Sage dictionary of social research methods. Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857020116 
Padayachee and Worku                                                                                              Information Security Incident Management Coordination 
The African Journal of Information Systems, Volume 12, Issue 2, Article 1    130 
Kossakowski, K.-P., et al. (1999). Responding to intrusions, CMU/SEI-SIM-006. Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering 
Institute. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA360500 
Kurapati, S., et al. (2012). A theoretical framework for shared situational awareness in sociotechnical systems. In A. Moore, 
V. Pammer, L. Pannese, M. Prilla, K. Rajagopal, W. Reinhardt, T.D. Ullmann, & C. Voigt (Eds.), Proceedings of 
the 2nd Workshop on Awareness and Reflection in Technology-Enhanced Learning. (pp.47-53. 
Kurapati, S., et al. (2013a). Exploring shared situational awareness in supply chain disruptions. In T. Comes, F. Fiedrich, S. 
Fortier, J. Geldermann, & T. Müller (Eds.), ISCRAM 2013: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on 
Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (pp. 151-155). 
Kurapati, S., et al. (2013b). Exploring shared situational awareness using serious gaming in supply chain disruptions 
[slideshare presentation]. Retrieved from https://www.slideshare.net/streamspotter/exploring-shared-situational-
awareness-using-serious-gaming-in-supply-chain-disruptions 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1986). But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in naturalistic evaluation. In D. D. 
Williams (Ed.), New directions for program evaluation (pp. 73-84). Jossey-Bass. https://doi.org/10.1002/ev.1427 
Linderoth, G., et al. (2015). Challenges in out-of-hospital cardiac arrest – a study combining closed-circuit television (cctv) 
and medical emergency calls. Resuscitation, 96, 317-322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2015.06.003 
Line, M. B. (2013). A case study: Preparing for the smart grids - identifying current practice for information security incident 
management in the power industry. In H. Morgenstern, R. Ehlert, F. Freiling, S. Frings, O. Goebel, D. Guenther, S. 
Kiltz, J. Nedon, & D. Schadt (Eds.), Seventh International Conference on IT Security Incident Management and IT 
Forensics (pp.26-32). https://doi.org/10.1109/IMF.2013.15 
Line, M. B., & Albrechtsen, E. (2016). Examining the suitability of industrial safety management approaches for information 
security incident management. Information & Computer Security, 24(1), 20-37. https://doi.org/10.1108/ICS-01-
2015-0003 
Line, M. B., et al. (2014). Information security incident management: Planning for failure. in F Freiling, H. Morgenstern, S. 
Frings, O. Goebel, D. Guenther, J. Nedon, & D. Schadt (Eds.), Eighth International Conference on IT Security 
Incident Management & IT Forensics (pp. 47-61). https://doi.org/10.1109/IMF.2014.10 
Lunenburg, F. C. (2010). Communication: The process, barriers, and improving effectiveness. Schooling, 1, 1-61. 
Madida, M. S. (2018). Innovative communication protocols for teaching in rural secondary schools [Unpublished master's 
thesis]. University of Zululand. 
March, S. T., & Storey, V. C. (2008). Design science in the information systems discipline: An introduction to the special 
issue on design science research. MIS quarterly, 32(4), 725-730. https://doi.org/10.2307/25148869 
McQuail, D., & Windahl, S. (2015). Communication models for the study of mass communications (2nd ed.). Routledge. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315846378 
Metzger, S., et al. (2011). Integrated security incident management--concepts and real-world experiences. In H. Morgenstern, 
R. Ehlert, S. Frings, O. Goebel, D. Guenther, S. Kiltz, J. Nedon, & D. Schadt (Eds.), Sixth International Conference 
on IT Security Incident Management and IT Forensics (pp.107-121). https://doi.org/10.1109/IMF.2011.15 
Moise, G. (2008). Communication models used in the online learning environment. In M. Vlada, G. Albeanu, & D.  Popovici 
(Eds.), Proceedings of The 3rd International Conference on Virtual Learning (pp. 247-254). 
Munkvold, B. E., & Bygstad, B. (2016). The land of confusion – clearing up some common misunderstandings of 
interpretive research. In NOKOBIT-Norsk Konferanse for Organisasjoners Bruk av Informasjonsteknologi, 24(1), 1-
12. 
Nofi, A. A. (2000). Defining and measuring shared situational awareness, CRM D0002895.A1. Center for Naval Analyses.  
Nyman, M., & Große, C. (2019). Are you ready when it counts?: IT consulting firm’s information security incident 
management. In P. Mori, S. Furnell, & O. Camp (Eds.), Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on 
Information Systems Security and Privacy (pp. 26-37). https://doi.org/10.5220/0007247500260037 
Oates, B. J. (2005). Researching information systems and computing, Sage. 
Padayachee, K., & Worku, E. (2017). Shared situational awareness in information security incident management. In 12th 
International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (pp. 479-483). 
https://doi.org/10.23919/ICITST.2017.8356454 
Padayachee and Worku                                                                                              Information Security Incident Management Coordination 
The African Journal of Information Systems, Volume 12, Issue 2, Article 1    131 
Ponterotto, J. G. (2005). Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on research paradigms and philosophy of 
science. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52(2), 126. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.52.2.126 
Reiter, B. (2013). The epistemology and methodology of exploratory social science research: Crossing Popper with Marcuse 
(Paper 99, pp. 1-22). University of South Florida Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications.  
Sandberg, J., & Alvesson, M. (2011). Ways of constructing research questions: Gap-spotting or problematization?. 
Organization, 18(1), 23-44. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508410372151 
Saunders, M. N., et al. (2019). Understanding research philosophy and approaches to theory development. In M N. K. 
Saunders, P. Lewis, & A. Thornhill (Eds.), Research methods for business students (pp. 128-170. Harlow,  Pearson 
Education. 
Scarfone, K., et al. (2008). Computer security incident handling guide, SP 800-61 Rev. 1. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r1 
Schramm, W. (1954). How communication works In W. Schramm (Ed.), The process and effects of mass communication (pp. 
3-26). University of Illinois Press. 
Sellnow, D. (2005). Confident public speaking (2nd ed.). Thomson/Wadsworth. 
Syahrial, H., et al. (2019). Information security policy compliance model at Indonesian government institutions: A conceptual 
framework. In J. Abawajy, M. Othman, R. Ghazali, M. Deris, H. Mahdin, & T. Herawan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Data Engineering (pp. 393-401). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1799-
6_41 
Taylor, S., et al. (2007). ITIL service design (3rd ed.). TSO publications. 
Tøndel, I. A., et al. (2014). Information security incident management: Current practice as reported in the literature. 
Computers & Security, 45, 42-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.05.003 
Valecha, R., et al. (2012). Messaging model for emergency communication. In Proceedings of the Mid-West Association of 
Information Systems. 
Velten, J. C., & Arif, R. (2016). The influence of snapchat on interpersonal relationship development and human 
communication. The Journal of Social Media in Society, 5(2), 5-43. 
Webb, J., et al. (2014). A situation awareness model for information security risk management. Computers & security, 44, 1-
15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.04.005 
Werlinger, R., et al. (2010). Preparation, detection, and analysis: The diagnostic work of it security incident response. 
Information Management & Computer Security, 18(1), 26-42. https://doi.org/10.1108/09685221011035241 
Wiant, T. L. (2005) Information security policy's impact on reporting security incidents. Computers & Security, 24(6), 448-
459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2005.03.008 
Wood, J. T. (2012). Communication in our lives (6th ed.). Wadsworth Publishing, Cengage Learning. 
Wood, J. T. (2014). Communication mosaics: An introduction to the field of communication (7th ed.). Wadsworth 
Publishing, Cengage Learning. 
Wooding, S., et al. (2003). Rising citizen awareness of information security: A practical guide. eAware Consortium. 
Yohannes, T., et al. (2019). Information security incident response management in an Ethiopian bank: A gap analysis. In 
Twenty-fifth Americas Conference on Information Systems (pp. 1-13). 
 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Note: The interview guide was designed to be conversational. 
PART I: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (EXPERTS ONLY) 
Background 
1.1. How many employees currently work in your organization? 
1.2. To which of the following organizational categories does your organization belong?  
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Organizational category Specialization 






Non-governmental organization □Local NGO  
□International NGO  
Private Sector □Commercial  
□Non-commercial  
Corporate organization □ 
Security organization □ 
Public relations & Marketing □ 
Other □ 
 
1.3. Which of the following Information systems does your organization deploy and utilize? 
□ Business and Commercial Information Systems 
□ Customer Information Systems 
□ Employee Management 
□ Data and Information Security 
□ National Security Systems 
□ Telecom & Network systems 
□ Other__________________________________ 
1.4. Which of the following information security mechanisms does your organization utilize? 
 
Information security mechanism Specific methods 
Technical Information Security 
 
□Antivirus and Anti-spyware 
□Firewall  
□Virtual private network 
□Encryption & Decryption  
□Intrusion and Detection System (IDS)  
□Endpoint  
□Backup and restore  
□Wireless security  
Physical Information security □Room  
□Human security 
□Hardware  
System and Data Security □Systems and network security  
□Business communications security  
□Web and application security  
Non-Technical Information security □Security employee training and awareness  
□Security policies and procedures  
□Policy: Corporate security policy, password policy, hiring and disciplinary policy  
Other □ 
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1.5. Which of the following aspects of information security awareness issues are addressed in your 
organizational information security policy document? 
□ Security incident handling 
□ Risk awareness 
□ Account usage (Username and Password) 
□ Internet application (Email, Downloading, and social media utilization) 
□ Software installation 
□ Antivirus installation and usage 
□ Other_________________________ 
1.6. Does your organization have a specific policy document on information security incident 
management issues? 
1.7. If your answer to the above question is ‘NO’, provide possible reasons for the lack of information 
security and incident management policies? 
2. Information security incident management  
2.1. Which of the following role-players in your organization is assigned the responsibility of 
developing incident management processes? 
□ ICT office 
□ Management or Executive body 
□ National regulatory body 
□ Organizational stakeholders 
□ Other ____________________________ 
2.2. Which of the following management levels plays an active role in awareness and communication 
regarding information security incident management? 
□ Top-Level Management   
□ Middle-Level Management   
□ Low-Level Management   
□ Not Applicable 
2.3. Describe the role that management currently plays/should play in information security incident 
awareness? 
2.4. Describe the role that management currently plays/should play in information security incident 
communication? 
2.5. Which of the following standards does your organization, currently comply?  
□ ISO/IEC 27001 
□ ISO/IEC 27002 Standard 
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□ ISO/IEC 27035 Standard 
□ The ITIL Framework 
□ NIST Special Publication 800-61 
□ ENISA - Good Practice Guide for Incident Management 
□ Nor SIS - Guideline for Incident Management 
□ SANS: Incident Handler's Handbook 
□ COBIT 5 
□ ISMM 
□ IEEE 802.11 
□ Other __________________ 
2.6. If your organization uses any of the above information security management standards, how does 
 it implement this with respect to information security incident management processes? 
2.7. If your organization does not apply any of the above information security incident management 
standards, provide possible reasons for the lack of standard usage. 
2.8. Does your organization have any formal agreement with employees regarding information security 
incident management process issues? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
2.9. If your answer to the above question is 'no', provide possible reasons for the lack of such agreement 
between the organization and the employees.  
2.10  Assess your organizations information security incident management processes  
No How does the organization manage the following 
incident management processes? 













1 Incident preparation and definition     
2 Incident identification/detection     
3 Incident assessment and analysis     
4 Incident response     
5 Incident awareness, understanding, anticipation and 
knowledge of employees 
    
6 Incident communication and reporting     
7 Information security policy efficiency     
Risk understanding and identification 
2.11. Rate the level of information security incident awareness and risk understanding of employees 
with respect to the following indicators? (Excellent, Very good, Good, Satisfactory, Fair, Poor) 












1 Knowledge about ICT system and      
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components 
2 Information security competence      
3 Reporting security incidents      
4 Up-to-date knowledge about relevant 
threats 
     
5 Learning from previous incidents      
 
2.12. Does your organization have a specific workflow for information security incident management 
 processes?  
□ Yes 
□ No 
2.13. If you have answered 'YES' to the previous question, comment on the following aspects:  
2.13.1. How is it prepared and maintained? 
2.13.2. How is it communicated to the members of the incident management team? 
2.14. Which of the following methods support managers in increasing awareness of information security 
incident management policies in your organization? 
No Awareness raising 
methods 





Screen savers, Banners on the intranet, Hyperlinks from the intranet homepage to the security 
page, Articles in the internal publication, Posters, Puzzles and games, Pre-printed note pads or 
sticky notes, T-shirts, Mugs and cups, Mouse pads, Stickers 
2 □Enforcing methods Underwriting security principles, Confidentiality agreements, Required awareness exam or 
test, Disciplinary actions for non-compliance, Inclusion in annual evaluations or, promotion 
criteria, Rewarding mechanisms 
3 □Educational 
methods 




Leaflets, Short articles or news stories, Intranet security web site postings, E-mail warnings,  
Information security guides, Tips-of-the-month, Flash cards,  Newsletters 
5 □Digital methods CD-ROM or DVD materials, simulated production, Audio-visual tools, Online methods, 





Adapted from (Johnson, 2006) 
2.15. Which of the following reporting mechanisms does your organization use to communicate with 
staff about information security incidents?  
□ Telephone reporting 
□ Manual/paper-based reporting 
□ Face-to-face contact or meeting 
□ Electronic means (E-mail, Social media, Mobile phone) 
□ Audio-visual/Multimedia format 
□ Special software application for incident reporting 
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□ Other_____________________________ 
2.16. How would you assess the level of an employee’s communication experience with respect to 
information security incident management among different clusters of employees in your organization?  
No Employee Cluster Excellent Very Good Good Satisfactory Fair Poor 
1 Top-Level management       
2 Middle-Level management       
3 Low-Level management       
4 End-users       
5 ICT Experts       
 
2.17. How frequently does your organization communicate regarding information security incidents? 
□ When an incident happens  
□ Quarterly  
□ Bi-annually  
□ Weekly 
□ Annually  
□ Monthly 
□ Other________________________ 
2.18. How does your organization communicate and report information security incidents to employees? 
2.19. In your opinion, what should be done to improve the awareness and communication strategies 
among employees and stakeholders in order to enhance information security incident management in 
your organization? 
2.20. What kind of challenges does your organization face regarding information security incident 
communication and awareness cases? 
2.21. In your opinion, how can communication with regard to information security incident management 
be effectively integrated into your organizational information security policy? 
3. Information Security Incident Management and End-users’ involvement 
3.1. Identify the role and relation of the various stakeholders with regard to Information security incident 
management issues in your organization. 
Stakeholder Role 
All staff members   
Line management  
Executive management and boards of directors  
Field staff  
Laptop users  
IT department  
IT help desk  
System and/or data owners  
E-mail users  
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Vendors and suppliers  
Other_________________  
 
3.2. Does your organization involve end-users in the process of information security incident awareness 
and communication matters?  
 □ Yes  
 □ No 
3.3. If your answer is 'YES’ to the above question, describe how your organization involves end-users in 
the process of information security and incident management policy issues? 
3.4. If your answer is ‘NO’ to question No 3.2, describe the reason why your organization does not 
involve end-users in the process of information security policy awareness and communication matters. 
3.5. Which information security incident cases, regarding end-users, are taken into account by the 
organization? 
□ All security cases 
□ Only non-technical cases 
□ Only technical cases 
□ Some higher level policy issues 
□ Other_________________________ 
PART II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (END-USERS ONLY) 
Have you ever been involved in the setting of information incident security management guidelines in 
your organization? 
If your answer to the above question is 'YES', describe your level of participation. 
Have you ever participated in an information security incident awareness program? 
If your answer to the above question is ‘YES’, describe your role with regard to communication and 
awareness aspects to improve information security incident management in your organization? 
If your answer to the question 3 is 'NO', what should your organization put into practice in order to 
involve end-users and stakeholders to improve awareness and communication? 
In your opinion, how can your organization plan and prepare better information security management 
through awareness and communication mechanisms? 
